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ABSTRACT
After discussing three models defining the relationship between rhetoric (linguistic 
form, verba) and theology (content, res) in scholarship’s history (part I), a theoretical 
discussion attempts to further undergird the third model according to which verba 
produce res (part II). As a first step, the inseparable intertwinement of res and verba 
is shown by empirical studies. The linguistic form always carries unspoken semantic 
content. Altering this form changes the content, even if a phrase’s logical meaning 
remains the same. As a farther-reaching second step, constructivist philosophy 
of language is used, holding that language creates reality. “Reality” is defined as 
constructed by the brain and language and differentiated from ontic reality. Four 
sources of evidence are identified that make such reality constructs plausible to 
groups. Part III discusses the theological concept of “new creation” in light of the 
second part’s findings. Part IV shows a way to overcome postmodern indifference 
with regard to “truth.” 
In one of his dinner speeches, Martin Luther once teasingly commented 
on the writings of his friends, his opponents, and his own books: Philipp 
Melanchton has both, res and verba; Erasmus only verba; Luther only res; 
and Karlstadt, his adversary, neither nor (Res et verba Philippus, verba sine 
re Erasmus, res sine verbis Lutherus, nec res nec verba Corolostadius) 
(Luther 1914:460, No. 3619). The concept underlying this humorous remark 
is the classical dichotomy between res and verba, which Quintilian summed 
up as “Each speech comprises that which is denoted (significantur), and 
that which denotes (significant), that is, it comprises both content and 
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words, res and verba” (Inst. 3.5.1; cf. 3.3.1). Res is dressed up in words. 
But, like with all dresses, a person can change their clothes or take them 
off and walk around naked, and still remain the same. or not? 
The german poet Johann wolfgang von goethe once joked, 
“Mathematicians are like Frenchmen: whatever you say to them, they 
translate it into their own language, and quickly it means something entirely 
different.”(goethe 1984:662 [my translation]). Change the linguistic form, 
and the content will too. oscar wilde would have nodded in consent. For 
him, the artistic form was highly charged with content; he considered the 
form a metaphor for the human struggle against the disorder of nature and 
life. If one took it away from his work by altering it, the work would collapse. 
Similarly, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 2:1-5, contends that the unassuming form 
of his preaching during his first visit in Corinth was the only aptum – the 
only adequate form – for the proclamation of a dreadful cross. If he had 
replaced this rhetorical form, the very content would have suffered. In the 
meta-reflexion of 1 Corinthians 2:1-5, Paul is aware that the form itself 
conveys content.
If this is true, it is surprising how little attention scholars of Pauline 
theology have paid to the rhetorical analysis of the Pauline letters. were 
they influenced by Luther’s nonchalance? The monumental “Theologies” of 
Paul the Apostle by James dunn (1998), Ferdinand hahn (2002) and others 
do not consider this kind of analysis useful for their purposes, following 
Luther’s lightheartedness. There are some exceptions though in the 
history of research that Johan S. Vos (2010:161-179) recently catalogued 
in a helpful typology. I modify Vos’ typology by reducing it to a set of three 
basic models that define the relationship between rhetoric and theology.
1. ThREE ModELS 
1.1 First model 
The traditional model is rooted in the classical division between content 
and form, between res and verba, as two more or less separate entities; the 
verba are just the external form of expression that Paul gave his theological 
thinking. Eduard Lohse (1996:108-115) and previously Johannes weiss, for 
example, represented this type, stating that one should discern between 
rhetorical devices in a text and the “doctrine that is already fixed and 
pronounced.”1 This concept seems to imply that the form of a content 
1 Translation by Vos (2010:162) from Johannes weiss (1897:4). In his conception 
of rhetoric, weiss understands rhetoric primarily as elocutio, not considering 
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is interchangeable; if you alter the form, the content remains the same. 
Again, changing the clothes does not change the person.
1.2 Second model 
Representatives of the second model also look for a coherent bedrock 
beyond the rhetoric of the text, but they admit that there is an intrinsic 
interweaving of rhetoric and theological argumentation – at least in some 
text portions. There, rhetoric and theology are intertwined, rubbing off on 
each other. 
In his book, Paulus: Der Apostel der Völker, Jürgen Becker (1989:170-
179, 288-294, 320-321) seems to assume that the relationship between 
theology and rhetoric is only relevant in polemical texts such as galatians 
where, according to him, apologetic partiality prevents a dogmatically well-
balanced treatment about faith and law and even leads to contradictions. 
Therefore, the exegete needs to discern between Paul’s subject matter, his 
Sachanliegen, and his theological argumentations presented as polemical 
attacks. 
Similarly, J. Christiaan Beker (1980; 1988:364-377) holds that there 
is a coherent and consistent core of Paul’s theological message, and 
rhetoric expresses this core contingently. According to him, Paul’s rhetoric 
“interweaves thought with praxis,” intertwining “a convictional basis of 
logos with the rhetoric of ethos and pathos” (1988:370).2 The contingent 
contexts of Paul’s diverse letters – with multiple social issues and different 
rhetorical situations – lead to various rhetorical devices, which, according 
to Beker, could eclipse the “truth of the gospel” (1988:365). By insisting 
on a coherent convictional core – the “truth of the gospel” – Beker tries 
to prevent Paul’s image from degenerating into the image of “a purely 
opportunistic theologian, who … adapts the gospel to whatever the … 
situation demands” (1988:367-68).  
According to Lauri Thurén’s dissertation, Derhetorizing Paul, the 
objective of galatians, for example, is “not theoretical, to educate the 
addressees, but pragmatic: to persuade them to make a decision to follow 
Paul ... The explicit theology in gal is therefore simplistic and polarized. 
Paul hardly records all his thoughts ... his presentation is one-sided”. 
Thurén therefore pleads for derhetorizing the text and for reconstructing 
a “possible theology beyond the text” (Thurén 2000:92-93; cf. 17, 26, 28, 
invention and argumentation as additional aspects of classical rhetoric.
2 In this view, logos solely belongs to the “convictional basis.” Vos (2010:164 n. 
7), however, rightly objects that logos also is a rhetorical category, questioning 
the strict distinction between core and contingent expression.
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181), which represents a coherent theoretical system of thought and can 
be found not only by comparing Paul’s letters, but also by identifying 
“the persuasive devices in the text[s] and to filter out their effect on the 
ideas expressed” (28). Thurén thus differentiates between the purpose 
of persuading, which leads to biased and even sometimes contradictory 
texts, on the one hand, and the goal of educating an audience on the 
other, which results in theoretically “well-balanced, neutral descriptions of 
reality” (88; cf. 25). The first texts are rhetorical, the second allegedly not. 
According to Thurén, the theoretical theological system that Paul has in his 
mind is only “partly reflected in his texts” (17; cf. 13). 
Two objections come to mind immediately:
(1) It seems audacious to claim that we can reconstruct the content 
of Paul’s thought world as a theoretical system beyond the text, 
while the text is the one and only source material. At best, we can 
construct such a system without any guarantee, however, that it will 
be congruent with what Paul himself had in mind. In secular studies 
of literature, asking what the intentions of an author were has been an 
obsolete question for almost a century now. 
(2) Second, Thurén’s distinction between persuasive rhetorical texts – with 
one-sidedness and exaggerations – on the one hand and theoretical, 
neutral, and non-rhetorical ones on the other seems to be theoretically 
unsound. “Purely” theoretical and well-balanced theoretical texts also 
want to persuade an audience of their truth; even they are persuasive 
and challenge the addressees to make a decision, that is, to accept 
their content or to reject it as truth. This holds especially for theoretical 
theological texts. They can be highly theoretical, but still affect the 
readers and influence their thoughts, possibly even their actions. They 
are rhetorical, too. we will have to return to this thought later. 
(3) A third objection concerns the coherence of Thurén’s own thinking. At 
one point his deliberations become blurry when he states: “yet Paul’s 
theology is not a solid, tension-free theology, which is only expressed 
in different ways. obviously the often overstated and exaggerated 
way of speech has its equivalent in his thinking … I would go so far as 
to suggest that theology is always rhetorical by nature. Theology … 
means that concepts must be simplified … in order to facilitate their 
understanding in both theory and communication” (Thurén 2000:181-
182). Thurén suddenly seems to distinguish three levels instead of 
two: the “exaggerated way of speech,” second a simplified “theology” 
“beyond the text,” which is rhetorical and not devoid of inner tension, 
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and third, as shown above, a complex but coherent, “well-balanced” 
theoretical theology, which is not rhetorical. 
For the Lutheran theologian hans hübner (1992:165-179; 1993:26-28 et 
al.), as a fourth representative of the second model, there is a “fundamental 
religious conviction” (theologische Grundüberzeugung) behind and 
beyond all rhetoric, which – inter alia – comprises the proclamation of the 
justification by faith alone. however, this basic conviction is unfolded in a 
dynamic, developing argumentation process, evolving from letter to letter, 
specifically from galatians to Romans. In Romans, for example, Paul does 
away with the antinominian aspect of galatians. hübner, thus, diagnoses 
contradictory theologies in Paul’s letters; the Pauline system of thought 
changes – except for its center, the proclamation of the justification solely 
by faith. 
Paul shows rhetorical competence in his developing argumentation 
process.3 hübner, therefore, consistently uses rhetorical analysis when 
describing Paul’s theology; his New Testament theology, in fact, is the 
only one to do so. Thus, for hübner, theology is a process of developing 
convincing arguments in a specific rhetorical situation in which content 
of theological thought and contingent rhetoric are intertwined. only the 
convictional core – the proclamation of the gospel of justification, for 
example – is not touched by rhetoric. It is faith-based and derives from 
something inaccessible to human argumentation and rhetoric. The 
theology of justification, however, is a rhetorically moulded argumentation 
process, which allows for modifications. one might wonder, however, 
whether or not the distinction between “proclamation” or kerygma on the 
one hand and “theology” on the other can be theoretically maintained. Is 
“proclamation” not rhetorical? 
Finally, Paul w. Meyer (1997:140-160) tackles the coherence-contin-
gency problem in Paul’s thinking by summarizing some of the work of the SBL 
Pauline Theology group. In his overview of the studies that he scrutinizes, 
he discovers that, for the authors of these works, a relatively coherent 
theological system has always been “the starting point … the repertoire 
… out of which Paul addresses … the particular crises he confronts” 
(148). Meyer himself, however, proposes looking at the outcome of Paul’s 
argumentation. Pauline theology is a product of a historical process; it is 
contingent itself. Therefore, one line of Paul’s theologizing can be logically 
incompatible with that of another. There is no “non-contingent bedrock 
of Pauline theological convictions;” every “conviction” in Paul’s letters is 
shaped by historical context (156). Consequently, Meyer asserts that “no 
3 For hübner (1992:168f.), Romans is “a rhetorical masterpiece of theological 
argumentation.”
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clear line can be drawn in Paul’s letters between argument, rhetoric … and 
theology” (150), nor between proclamation and theology (153). 
having arrived at this relatively radical conclusion that diagnoses a 
completely rhetorical character of Paul’s theology, Meyer nonetheless 
feels compelled to look for something beyond Paul’s contingent theology. 
Meyer asserts that the foundational Christian conviction, the belief in 
Jesus’ resurrection, was brought into existence and authorized by a 
“compelling datum” beyond all human rhetoric, that is, by something that 
god has done. god’s act is the “bedrock” that lays the foundation for 
human “convictions” (Meyer 1997:156-157). Furthermore, god’s Spirit is at 
work in the process of human persuasion (160). 
It is apparent that these statements by Meyer represent a legitimate 
Christian belief, which most Christians, including the author of this article, 
share. But like any faith, Meyer’s conviction is not a scholarly controllable 
statement. It is located on a meta-analytical level, and therefore not helpful 
in the academic setting. In the latter, we have to state that the belief in 
Jesus’ resurrection is a conviction that Meyer tries to withhold from the 
influence of rhetoric: a non-rhetorical core beyond all of Paul’s contingent 
and rhetorical theologizing. 
The representatives of the second model have in common that they 
always look for some bedrock that is kept back from the influence of 
rhetoric; but all texts are rhetorical in one way or another. The advocates of 
the model look for an absolute res held back from contextual contingency 
of the verba. Johan Vos (2010:172) rightly labels this approach as Platonic, 
marked by binary oppositions such as reality/appearance, essential/
peripheral, or things/words; the verba, rhetoric, “are the contingent 
representations of the res.” Platonists hold that truth exists independently 
of human perceptions about it and of the variety of words in which these 
perceptions are expressed. This Platonic axiom underlies both the first 
and the second models. 
1.3 Third model 
The third model turns the relationship upside down. It holds that the verba 
construct the res. Clothes make the man – or the woman. According to 
Andrew T. Lincoln, in his study of Ephesians (Lincoln and wedderburn 
1993:76), the verba construct a symbolic universe, which serves the 
writer’s pastoral purposes. Theology and rhetoric do not relate to each 
other like content and form. Rather, the theological content as a whole 
is part of the rhetorical means in attaining a practical goal, which Lincoln 
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(1993:91) defines as “strengthening the self-understanding” of the readers 
and promoting a “distinctive behavior.” 
Lincoln does not go into any theoretical deliberations. Nor does 
Johan Vos, who himself adheres to the third model. Vos (2010:172) labels 
the model “(neo-) sophistic” or “social-constructivist” without deeper 
theoretical underpinning.4 Truth itself is contingent, Vos (2010:172) asserts, 
“created moment by moment in the circumstances” in which persons find 
themselves and with which they have to cope.5
when discussing several applications of the third model to exegetical 
material, Vos is adamant that Paul’s “theological arguments are 
always a means to an end. depending on his goal, he creates realities” 
(174). Examples: (1) Paul attributes four different functions to the law. 
According to Rom 1:18-3:21; 7:10-11, the law brings about death 
as the consequence of transgressing the law. According to Rom 
5:13, because of Adam’s trespass, sin and death were in the world 
before the law was introduced. The law only makes sure that sin is 
accounted; before the Sinai, sin was not accounted. According to 1 
Cor. 15:56, the law triggers and provokes sinful behaviour. According 
to Philippians 3:2-11, there is a human righteousness coming from the 
law and a divine one coming through faith in Christ. The aim of all 
four different constructions is to “convince the readers that salvation 
is only possible through Christ. It seems as though the apostle has 
a bag of arguments and chooses whatever he needs to that end. he 
is creating theological realities as rhetorical means [of persuasion] 
with a rhetorical aim” (175, italics by me). (2) hübner’s “fundamental 
conviction” of the justificatio impii is itself a rhetorical means for the 
practical higher end of defending the rights of gentile converts to be 
full heirs to the promise of god (175, citing Krister Stendahl). (3) Paul’s 
theologia crucis in 1 Corinthians 1-4 is a rhetorical strategy toward 
the practical goal of defending his authority, according to Vos (176). 
however, while this is true for 2 Corinthians, it is not for 1 Corinthians 
1-4, where Paul’s goal is to destruct the haughtiness of the apostolic 
parties, who are puffed up against each other by being cocky about 
the wisdom of their respective apostles. (Cf. Lampe 1990:117-131.) (4) 
Paul’s different Christological conceptions are simply means toward 
4 Vos refers to several pages in g. A. olson (2002:85-113, esp. 85-87, 94-96) 
where olson discusses Stanley Fish. Fish, however, is an outspoken anti-
theorist (olson 2002:86). In other words, the lack of theoretical underpinning 
seems programmatic. Fish himself confesses: “I myself have not made 
elaborate arguments for a social constructionist view – though I have used 
such arguments ...” (olson 2002:94).
5 R. I. Scott (1967:17); cf. T. Enos and S. C. Brown (1993:126 et al.).
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the higher end of confirming the supremacy of Jesus as Lord (Vos 
2010:176-177, following wilfred Knox). 
The ultimate goal of Paul’s symbolic theological world, however, 
is non-theological, as Vos asserts, embracing an ideology-critical 
“rhetoric of power” by searching for systems of power in systems of 
thought (177). For him, the confession “Jesus is Lord of both the Jews 
and the gentiles” is driven by the goal of expanding power, reflected 
in the symbol of a national deity conquering the world; Israel’s god is 
supposed to dominate the world (1 Cor. 15:24-28; Rom. 1:5; 15:18; 2 
Cor. 10:4-5). In my opinion, however, Vos falls short of proving that this 
represents a non-theological goal. or does Paul want the social entity 
of the people of Israel to dominate the world? hardly. The proclamation 
of universal sovereignty of Israel’s god represents a “power struggle” 
within the pantheon of the Roman world, that is, within the realm of 
theological thought worlds. The next question would be which social 
group could profit from Paul’s universalistic-monotheistic thought 
world. If not Israel, the church? Vos does not ask this question. 
Similarly, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (1999: esp. 93, 177) holds that 
language creates and shapes symbolic worlds, constructing reality instead 
of reflecting it. Language, therefore, is performative, not descriptive, 
“articulated in specific situations” with certain “interests in mind” (93). 
I go even further: Language is performative even without the speaker 
having particular “interests in mind.” If Mrs. obama – hypothecally 
speaking – baptizes an aircraft carrier in Norfolk in the name of “Sarah 
Palin,” she uses performative language, saying “I baptize you in the 
name of …” when smashing a champagne bottle on the ship’s hull. A 
journalist of the local radio station reporting the event uses descriptive 
words – according to J. L. Austin’s language model. however, is 
the reporter’s language merely descriptive? It is also performative 
in the sense that it shapes the minds of the radio listeners. They 
get the impression that the obamas not only care about health care 
reform, but also about the military; that they are open to conciliatory 
bipartisanship because they agree to name the warship “Sarah Palin,” 
etc. The reporter himself only wants to inform about the event, but 
his language may be performative even beyond his own interests. 
Informing always also implies forming and shaping – whether the 
speaker wants it or not. Language is never merely descriptive. 
In the same way, theological texts – no matter how theoretical or 
abstract or purely educational they might be (see Thurén above) – 
are always persuasive, whether this is intended by the author or not, 
because they always challenge the reader to make a decision. “Can I, 
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as a reader, agree with this text or not?” This question hovers between 
the lines of all theological texts – actually all texts, even dry reports (“do 
I believe this or not?”). Even doxologies carry this challenge, because 
the readers or listeners need to decide whether or not they can join 
in with this praise of god. Furthermore, often independently from or 
against authorial intent, theological texts as rhetorical, persuasive 
language events not only appeal to the readers’ rational mind but 
inevitably also to their emotions, which either further or impede the 
persuasion. Neuroscience in recent years has shown that emotions 
are far more influential in our decision-making processes than we 
previously thought (cf., e.g., gigerenzer 2008). 
Schüssler Fiorenza, similarly to Vos, proceeds to expand the third 
model with a political spin. when meaning is constructed, she contends, 
interests of certain people are served and power dynamics are at work. 
Thus, one of the main tasks of Biblical theological and rhetorical studies 
is to detect structures of domination and exclusion encoded in both the 
historical texts and the discourses of modern Biblical scholars. Schüssler 
Fiorenza redefines the discipline of Biblical theology as a “critical theo-
ethical rhetoric” (1999:27, 93, 176-179). 
2. VERbA PRodUCE RES: CoNSTRUCTIVISM
without questioning Schüssler Fiorenza’s legitimate agenda, this article, 
however, will take a different direction by dragging the discussion to a 
more fundamental theoretical level. Two steps need to be taken.
2.1 First step
The content of a linguistic message and its formulation, res and verba, 
are intertwined, inseparably depending on each other. The way you word 
phrases influences the content of your message. Even if the logical content 
of the phrase did not change once you altered the words, the content would 
change anyway, because the form always carries unspoken semantic 
content as well. An optimist at a party describing a glass of wine as half-
full tacitly also conveys, “oh, there is still some time to enjoy together;” the 
pessimist with his half-empty glass implies, “oh, the glass will be empty 
soon; before long, I will be leaving” – and the economist says, “you have 
50% more glass than you really need.” A more serious example, researched 
by psychologists a few years ago, is the doctor telling the patient that 
he has a 90% chance of surviving an operation. Between the lines, this 
message conveys that an operation is the best option for the patient. In an 
experiment, patients informed in this way chose surgery more frequently 
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than patients who were told that there is a 10% chance of dying during the 
operation (Edwards et al. 2001:61-82). In another experiment, a full glass of 
water and an empty one were put on the table. The participants were asked 
to pour half of the water into the other glass and to place the half-empty 
glass at the edge of the table. Most decided to move the glass that had 
been full before. Then other participants were asked to move the half-full 
glass. Most chose the one that had been empty before (Sher & McKenzie 
2006:467-494; McKenzie & Nelson 2003:596-602). Psycholgists dub the 
way sentences are worded “framing.” The last experiment confirms again 
that the liguistic framing, that is, rhetoric, contains information between the 
lines. In this case, the dynamics of the situation are encoded in the framing. 
Even physicists, for example, Richard P. Feynman (1990:69f.), emphasize 
the importance of verbally formulating one and the same physical law in 
different ways. with this method, the researcher increases the chance of 
making new discoveries. Although mathematically identical, the framings 
are psychologically different, he insists.
what do empirical studies such as these mean for New Testament 
exegesis? A few examples might serve as illustrations. If you take away the 
parable framings from Jesus’ teaching, important unspoken signals will be 
lost. By confronting his audiences with parables, Jesus asks them to figure 
out on their own what these stories mean. Thus, he grants them the mature 
status of interpreters and trusts them with finding the sense of his speech, 
making them co-creators of sense. This is different from plainly telling 
them with imperatives: “Listen, don’t look down on Samaritans, because 
they can be as loving and considerate as our religious elite, sometimes 
even more so.”6
In the first chapters of Acts, Luke puts an archaic Septuaguint Bible 
language in the mouth of the apostle Peter. This patina conveys unspoken 
content: the first years of the church are portrayed as a distinctly past time 
of salvation history, deliberately set apart from the present time of Luke’s 
church in the last quarter of the first century. In addition, the Septuagint 
patina conveys the impression of continuity with Israel’s history. 
The text of 1 Corinthians 3, dealing exclusively with Apollos and Paul, 
although Peter also is a “hero” of a Corinthian faction, implies as unspoken 
content that Paul, after the clash in Antioch, does not want another fight 
6 Furthermore, by leaving a literary Leerstelle (gap) for the readers to fill, the 
text becomes more convincing, as Quintilian asserts: the hearers accept as 
true what they have found out for themselves, taking pleasure in detecting 
a meaning on their own and applauding their own cleverness, whereas they 
might not accept a message if it were told to them directly (Inst. 9.2.78). Also 
this element would be lost if the form were abandoned. 
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with Peter, that he wishes to remain at peace with him. he therefore only 
relativises the authority of Apollos and Paul directly, thereby handling 
Peter with velvet gloves, that is, with a rhetorical shema that leaves his 
name unmentioned.7 The form of the shema conveys content tacitly. If it 
were not delivered between the lines, the message, “Also Peter’s authority 
is only relative, but I want to stay at peace with him,” (1) would not fit into 
the flow of the context; (2) it would raise unnecessary questions by the 
Corinthians who did not necessarily know about the strife between Peter 
and Paul in Antioch (“what happened? did they have a fight?”), and (3) it 
might contra-productively have scratched old scars, if not wounds. In 1 
Corinthians 1-2, Paul’s rhetorical shema similarly implies that he does not 
want to criticize the wisdom of Apollos directly – because then he would 
sink to the level of the Pauline faction and be part of the interparty strife.8 
Furthermore, if Revelation clothes an economic-political protest 
against the dominating powers of its time in veiled images – the emperor, 
for example, is symbolized by an animal – then it conveys either that 
(1) someone is afraid of being persecuted (but also a coward) or, more 
importantly, (2) that only insiders can understand this protesting outcry 
(“who has ears, listen!”). Thus, a sort of conspiracy group of esoteric, 
“understanding” insiders was created by the text. The veiled form 
strengthened the cohesion of the Christian groups. This cohesion was 
important when getting ready for a major confrontation with the Roman 
authorities that the author – albeit incorrectly – saw as imminent. If we 
changed the veiled form into “direct” speech, this content between the 
lines would be lost.
In Isaiah 42:13-14, as a last example, yahweh is compared to a “man 
of war” and a “woman in labour.” Placing these rhetorical similes side by 
side neutralizes any gender specificity of god. god embraces both “male” 
and “female” aspects. drop one of these two rhetorical expressions, and 
the content will have a different slant.
2.2 Second step
The second step takes us a little further by building on the third model 
discussed above: verba create reality (res). The present article tries 
to undergird this model with more intense theoretical discussion and 
afterwards applies the results to an example of Pauline theology, his concept 
7 For this shema, see further Lampe (1990:130).
8 See further Lampe (1990:130).
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of καινὴ κτίσις, “new creation.” Looking for a viable linguistic-philosophical 
undergirding of the third model, the road leads to constructivism. why?9
The so-called “postmodern” intellectual situation of today is still 
characterized by the shock caused by the collapse of logical empiricism 
in the 1970s. what brought about the downfall of logical empiricism in 
the 1970s at the latest was its understanding of sense data statements 
as an allegedly unchanging foundation of the structures of knowledge, 
above which theoretical propositions are in flux – the latter come and go 
and are replaced with better ones. By contrast, sense data statements 
are purportedly independent from these theoretical propositions.10 But this 
was a fundamental error, as Mary hesse (1970:36-77), for example, showed 
once again in 1970.11 There is no observational language independent from 
theory. Theory shapes perception; observation statements are not immune 
from theory. 
Since the collapse of logical empiricism, the epistemological cards 
have been shuffled again. we had to discuss afresh not only whether and 
how we can arrive at an assured knowledge of reality, but also – on an 
even much more elementary level – what we mean when we say “reality.” 
That which is called reality is neither located in the world outside alone, as 
naive realism would have it, nor is it purely mental, as for example george 
Berkeley (1685-1753) thought. The solution of the puzzle lies somewhere 
between the extreme poles of naive realism and ontological idealism. But 
where in between?
From the spectrum of the attempts to answer this question, this article 
focuses on constructivism, which, in interdisciplinary fashion, has been 
expressed in different forms since the 1980s. Building on the painful 
realization, brought about by the collapse of logical empricism, that there 
is no guarantee that our perception and knowledge accurately represent 
9 For the following, see further Lampe (2012: Chapter 2).
10 on the basis of the logic of gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, it seemed 
possible to describe science as a system of logical relations between empirical 
foundations and theoretical superstructures, between particular cases and 
general laws. For logical empiricism, propositions that are not purely logical 
definitions ultimately always have to rely on sense data statements for their 
verification – sense data statements to which they have to stand in a correct 
logical relation. P. Churchland (1988: e.g., 271), offers a critical assessment 
of rational empiricism since Bertrand Russel (Russel 1956 [1924]:321-343) and 
Rudolf Carnap (1966).
11 Much earlier, arguing against Carnap, already o. Neurath (1932/33:204-214). 
Also Paul K. Feyerabend (1963:3-39; or 1981), for example, tore down the 
allegedly absolute barrier between theory and observation, between fact and 
interpretation.
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the ontic reality, the principal constructivist thesis holds that humans 
manufacture their own reality. They construct it. Reality is a construct of 
the brain. Alongside the traditional philosophical-epistemological reasons, 
neurobiological grounds speak for this.12 Constructivists thus differentiate 
between the external ontic reality, to which our cognition has no reliably 
guaranteed access, on the one hand and our brain-constructed reality on 
the other. however, if reality is a construct of the brain, then the relationship 
between res and verba, between “things” and “words,” is no longer that 
of representation or description – in the sense that our verba describe the 
ontic reality existing beyond the words – but rather the verba of our brain 
create the res, language creates reality, i.e., brain-constructed reality, and 
this then is res. 
Nonetheless, if reality is a construct of the brain, this does not mean that 
constructivists are thinking of slipping into solipsism, according to which 
the world for human beings consists only of their imaginations – in the 
sense of “only I exist, and everything else is my fantasy.” No, ontic reality 
exists independently from us and our consciousness. Parts of it can even 
be experienced, but they cannot be cognized in reliable ways. The ontic 
world is experienced to the extent that again and again it sets up barriers 
to our actions. These resistances are a decisive argument for the existence 
of the external ontic reality. only, for the constructivists, this “world of 
objective obstacles, of ontic barriers among which we act ... [remains] … 
fundamentally inaccessible [for the human brain] and indescribable” (Von 
glasersfeld 1985:19). Allegorically speaking, our epistemological situation 
is comparable to us moving around in an unknown dark attic, that is, in the 
ontic reality, bumping our knees and head. gradually our brain makes up 
an image of this room although our only sensual perception is the sense 
of touch. we can never be sure that our brain’s image of the room really 
corresponds to what the room will look like when we turn on the light. 
Actually, there will be surprises when the light is switched on. Even if we 
gradually learn to move around in this room better with fewer bruises, 
this only means that our mental image of the room is viable to a certain 
degree, but the viability does not guarantee that the image of our brain 
is “objective” in the sense that it faithfully reflects the ontic reality of the 
room. Assuming this would be presumptuous, because our mental image 
of the unknown attic is influenced, for example, by our memory of other 
rooms that we experienced in the past and to which we draw analogies in 
order to attain a picture without seeing. 
12 For philosophical as well as neurobiological reasons, see further, e.g., Lampe 
(2012: Chapters 2-3); for neurobiology, see Roth (2001).
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In the framework of such a theory, has the concept of objectivity 
finished its tour of duty? For constructivists, “objectivity” needs to be 
redefined. A constructed reality is “objective” only in the sense that 
it describes an inter-subjective, social reality shared by more than one 
person. Such knowledge is objective in the sense “that it proves to be 
useful…in inter-subjective, supra-individual, institutionalized contexts” 
(Stenger & geißlinger 1991:250). Collectively useful knowledge, reinforced 
by communal and culturally specific institutions, appears to the individual 
person as a preset “objective” reality “outside” of one’s own subjectivity.
how does inter-subjective reality come into being? how do several 
people come to an agreement about what is real and what is not? what 
factors play a role in the process of construction? what makes it certain 
to these people that a constructed reality is not arbitrary? what sources 
of evidence make it plausible? Answers to these questions have been 
attempted with the help of experimental sociology of knowledge.13 To 
sum up the most important results, a first source of evidence is empirical 
experience, the perception of the senses. This empirical evidence is 
increased the more certain experiences are repeated and, in addition, 
spread to other subjects of experience. Repetition and dissemination 
played a role, for instance, in the sensory experience of the Easter visions, 
as can be apprehended from 1 Corinthians 15:5-8. First, Peter saw, then the 
twelve, then more than 500 followers – all together six visual experiences.14 
Their repetition and dissemination, for the earliest Christians, enhanced 
the plausibility of the proposition “god raised Jesus from the dead” (Rom. 
4:24; 8:11; gal. 1:1).
A second source of evidence is cognitive construction. during the 
production of reality, we associate various elements of knowledge with 
each other, connecting the dots. we manufacture connections, for 
example, causal connections. These are connections that our brain 
makes, but we never can be sure, as already david hume noted, that two 
events following one another are necessarily bound together as cause and 
effect.15 Nonetheless, these associations become evident to us primarily 
on the basis of two principles of construction: evidence presents itself 
13 See, e.g., the experimental study by Stenger and geißlinger (1991). 
14 The historicity of the ὤφθη (“appeared”) is not to be doubted, no matter how one 
chooses to explain the coming about of these visions. 
15 d. hume (1972:63) wrote: “when we ... consider the operation of causes, we 
are never able ... to discover any ... necessary connection, any quality, which 
binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of 
the other. we only find that the one does actually ... follow the other ... there is 
not ... anything which can suggest the idea of ... necessary connection”. See 
further Lampe (2012:9f.).
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by means of coincidence and congruence. our brain makes connections 
when two elements of knowledge coincide or when they are similar. when 
it rains, and at the same time I develop a headache, this coincidence 
may lead me to connect the two units causally. By contrast, evidence by 
congruence presents itself when similarity is discovered. A large number 
of propositions in history books rest on this principle. historians cannot 
get by without conclusions based on analogy. “Since Roman senators 
usually had farming estates out in the country, also Senator Valerius must 
have had one,” although we have no documentation of this. historians 
undertake this kind of reasoning every day, thus constructing history.    
The third source of evidence is social confirmation, which is turning 
oneself over to the judgment of others, above all to experts. Very few 
among us have been in space and seen the earth as a sphere in the 
universe; we have relied on experts who had told us that the earth is round 
long before photography was invented.
A fourth source of evidence is feelings. Expectations directed toward 
the future, retrospective interpretations, or statements about the present 
world evoke emotions. If they are of a positive sort, plausibility is more 
likely to present itself. Neuroscience has shown that emotions are far more 
influential in our decision-making processes than previously thought in our 
modern rationalistic culture.16 In antiquity, the message that god acted on 
a cross and brought about salvation at such a despicable place evoked 
disgust. Such a doctrine was therefore implausible for many people and 
did not become an element of their construction of reality (1 Cor. 1:18ff.). 
By contrast, the Christian message in the synagogues that gentile god-
fearers, who liked the idea of monotheism but did not want to fulfil the 
entire Torah, should no longer be second class believers but completely 
valid members of the community without the price of circumcision 
evoked positive emotions, thereby facilitating Christian mission to pagan 
sympathizers on the fringes of the synagogues. The role of emotions in the 
construction of reality is not to be underestimated.  
3. VERbA gENERATE RES: ThE ExAMPLE oF ThE  
 “NEw CREATIoN”
In a next step, an example of the process of constructing reality in early 
Christianity will be investigated with the help of the four categories made 
available.17 In this way, writing a history of theology also takes into account 
16 See the discussion above at the end of Section I.
17 For this as well as other examples, see in more detail Lampe (2012: Chapter 7).
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• the empirical experiences,
• the social networks (evidence through “social confirmation”), and
• the emotional states 
of human subjects who constructed reality, thus also that which often 
is designated as the “situation” of theologizing subjects. Instead of being 
reduced to a mere analysis of cognitive construction, written only as a 
“history of ideas” or “traditions,” a constructivist history of theology is 
multidimensional.
The concept of a “new creation” (καινὴ κτίσις) posited that, in baptism, 
Christians are created anew. “Anyone who is in Christ is a new creation. 
The old has passed away; see, everything has become new” (2 Cor. 
5:17; cf. gal. 6:15; Rom. 6:4). how “realistically” is this language to be 
understood? what is the ontological character of the new creation that 
– so early Christians claimed – takes place in the personality of the 
baptized? According to Peter Stuhlmacher (1967:1-35), who takes an emic 
perspective, the Creator calls the baptism candidates and with this creative 
word “really” alters their pre-baptismal existences into “new creations” 
during the sacrament. Pre-Pauline and Pauline Christianity understood 
baptism as entering a process of “actual” transformation of the human 
person. From an etic perspective, was this an “illusion”? Not at all. on the 
one hand, from a constructivist perspective, the early Christians’ words 
– “we are a new creation” – constructed the reality that in becoming a 
Christian, a radical alteration of personality begins. The verba constructed 
this res. on the other hand, for a constructivist, the question about whether 
or not this constructed anthropological model corresponded to the ontic 
reality can in principle never be answered – because constructivists do not 
see any epistemological basis for humans to make confident statements 
about the ontic reality. Exegetes should therefore no longer chase after 
such answers. They are void, because res is defined as constructed 
and intersubjectively shared reality, not as ontic reality. Rather, for 
construtivists, a more pressing question is, what sources of evidence did 
this early Christian image of the self feed on, and what consequences 
for behaviour did it set free? what allowed this anthropological model to 
appear plausible to early Christian constructors, so that it became valid 
and effective in early Christian communities?
Evidence through cognitive construction: The early Christians’ cognitive 
construction started at the point where similarity was discovered between 
the baptismal ritual of being immersed and surfacing from the water on the 
one hand and the death and resurrection of Christ on the other. Connecting 
the two events created a new meaning – in the sense that both events were 
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considered to be simultaneous during the sacrament. The death-and-
resurrection destiny of Christ was conceived of as being made present in 
baptism. Thus, it was concluded that, in their immersion and surfacing, the 
candidates for baptism participated in Christ’s destiny: In baptism, they 
died and were buried with him in order to rise with him into a new existence 
(Romans 6). Understood as such, the sacrament of baptism represented a 
cognitive construction that had solidified into a ritual, dramatized time and 
again in ritual praxis. 
Evidence through experience: Empirical knowledge: A cognitive 
construction congealed into physical ritual opens up space for experience. 
during the submersion of the body in water, early Christians experienced 
physically that they were symbolically dying with Christ and were “buried 
with him” (Rom. 6:4; cf. gal. 2:19b; Rom 7:4), baptized into his death (Rom. 
6:3). In emerging again, early Christian enthusiasts experienced rising 
with Christ.18 Paul himself modified this enthusiastic interpretation to the 
effect that in baptism Christians are gifted with a new life qualified by new 
behaviour (Rom. 6:4), with their eschatological resurrection remaining in 
the future (6:9). 
Furthermore, in being immersed and emerging, those being baptized 
drank of one Spirit (1 Cor. 10:4; 12:13; cf. 6:17), which was considered 
identical with the risen Kyrios (2 Cor. 3:17); the Christians internalized 
Christ in this way. “It is not longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives 
in me” (gal. 2:20). when they came out of the water, they put on a new 
garment, being “clothed with Christ” (gal. 3:27; cf. Rom 13:14). Sensual 
experience undergirded these theological constructions. The impressive 
initiation ritual produced evidence by experience. 
In addition, subsequent charismatic experiences, above all speaking in 
tongues and prophecy, were perceived as the effects of being filled with 
the Spirit. These experiences, repeated time and again in institutionalized 
weekly meetings and rituals (1 Cor. 12-14), helped the early Christian self-
image as a new creation to appear plausible.
Evidence through social confirmation: Alongside the evidence-
producing reiterations of experiences in weekly meetings, there also was 
the broad dissemination of such experiences, because each Christian 
went through the ritual of baptism. In addition, the probability of being 
affected by the charismatic phenomena was high because, in the 
dynamic gatherings of these early Christians, there was little control of 
the pneumatic events. Their meetings could become chaotic, as can be 
18 A future resurrection therefore appeared to be superfluous to them (1 Cor. 
15:12; 4:8). 
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inferred from 1 Corinthians 12; 14. Potentially, the dynamics could carry 
each person away. The Spirit “blows where it will” (John 3:8).
Thus, all of those who were baptized were more or less exposed to the 
events depicted, which allowed them to experience their newly created 
existence. Furthermore, because the empirical knowledge was shared 
by all of them, they mutually could confirm their newly created existence. 
Social confirmation was produced.
Evidence through positive emotions: Strong emotions triggered by 
the rituals provided evidence. The sacramental rituals and congregational 
meetings presented emotionally appealing celebrations of intimate 
fellowship: both with Christ and with other people who were devoted 
to one another. In the small groups of early Christian house churches, 
baptism meant initiation into a fellowship of people who, as a rule, were 
devoted to one another in a familial manner. 
Furthermore, the Christian’s fellowship with Christ implied an 
emotionally charged self-identification with the dying and rising Christ 
during baptism,19 which enforced the perception of being created anew. 
why? Seen from a psychological perspective, processes of identification 
with another person indeed bring about partial changes in the psyche: at 
least emotions, motivations, and behaviour are restructured, psychologists 
assert.20 These changes heightened the self-perception of being created 
anew. From a psychological view, thus, the early Christian assertion of 
entering a new existence represents an ontological statement; something 
in the personality is “actually” altered. At this point, an early Christian 
reality and a psychologically formulated reality are nicely compatible. 
But both realities are constructed, because from the perspective of the 
constructivist meta-level, such affirmations are in principle impossible as 
statements about the ontic reality, no matter whether they are positioned 
in a psychological or a theological context. Each supposedly ontological 
proposition merely presents a building stone in a construct of reality. But 
there, within the constructed building of reality, the self-image of being 
created anew “is” then something real that effectively generates results in 
the Christians’ behaviour (Rom 6:4). 
19 Rom 6:3f. Moreover, not only in baptism but also in the Christian’s subsequent 
existence, Paul perceived himself as being crucified with Christ, “carrying 
around in our body the death of Jesus” (2 Cor. 4:10; see further, e.g., Phil. 3:10; 
gal. 2:19b; 6:17; Rom. 8:17b; 2 Cor. 4:7-12,16-17; 11:23b-33; 1 Cor. 4:9-13). 
20 See Lampe (1995:937-941), with recourse to psychoanalytical literature. In 
Rom. 6:4b, Paul detects changes in behaviour when speaking of the process of 
identification in 6:3-4.
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Constructivism does not say that, in ontic reality, baptism does not 
initiate a change of personality. It only contends that we cannot make 
valid statements about ontic reality. The same holds for the existence 
of god, for instance. The constructivist does not assert that there is no 
god out there in the ontic reality. Neither this nor the opposite statement 
about the ontic reality is possible from a constructivist view. But this also 
means that, on the ontological level, a constructed reality in which god 
plays a role is in no way inferior to another constructed reality in which 
god does not occur. None of the constructing individuals has the right to 
look down arrogantly on another, as if their own knowledge allegedly were 
ontologically of higher value. Seen from an ontological point of view, all 
constructing subjects sit in the same boat; no one has a head start with 
his or her knowledge over another. Consequently, for representatives of 
the Christian tradition, the situation for discussion has improved in the 
intellectual scenario. Constructivism provides – inadvertently – apologetic 
services for theology. The situation for discussion has improved because 
a theocentric construct of reality enters with equal rights on the same 
level as other constructs. If the constructivist approach makes one thing 
possible for theology, it is this: that theology – as an advocate of present 
day Christian tradition, that is, of past constructs of reality to which we 
stand in continuity in our culture – remains capable of being communicated 
in a secularized intellectual environment.
4. CoNCLUSIoN: CoMPETITIoN
In constructivism, the question of truth is asked differently from what 
is conventional. one no longer asks about the connection of a verbal 
statement to ontic reality, because nothing certain can be said about this 
connection. Reality (res) is a construct of the brain, and such a construct 
stands as “true” when important sources of evidence flow convincingly. 
Is it possible to leave behind the post-modern situation of subjective 
preferences in which there is only fragmentation, that is, disparity, the 
positioning of equally valid constructs side by side? where everything 
is equally valid, indifference arises – and arbitrary preferences come up, 
which the author of this article is unwilling to accept as the ultimate result 
and therefore calls for a fair contest among those who are equally valid 
in regard to the ontological quality of their propositions and constructs – 
a competition between an atheist and a theocentric construct of reality, 
for example. In such a competition, the contenders have to let the four 
sources of evidence flow more abundantly than the others. 
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The ontological equality of constructs not only brings down a possibly 
haughty atheist from a world view of supposedly ontologically higher 
value, requiring humility, but it also demands humility of a representative of 
the Christian design of reality – exactly because all competing designs of 
reality are equally positioned in regard to ontological quality. our thinking 
will only be able to come along unassumingly, not in the magnificent 
vestments of claims to absoluteness.  Christians have to put on work 
clothes and make an effort to supply the better reasons in the postmodern 
competition of constructed world views. That is, Christians have to let the 
sources of evidence flow into the world more abundantly than others. This 
is their challenge.
BIBLIogRAPhy
Becker, J. 
1989. Paulus: Der Apostel der Völker. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Beker, J.c. 
1980. Paul the apostle. Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
1988. Paul’s theology: consistent or inconsistent? NTS 34:364-377.
carnap, r. 
1966. Der logische Aufbau der Welt. hamburg: Meiner.
churchland, p. 
1988. Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain. Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press.
dunn, J.d.G. 
1998. The theology of Paul the apostle. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
edwards, a., elwyn, G.J., covey, J., Mathews, e. & pill, r. 
2001. Presenting risk information: A review of the effects of ‘framing’ and other 
manipulations on patient outcomes. Journal of Health Communication 6:61-82.
enos, t. & Brown, s.c. (eds.) 
1993. Defining the New Rhetorics. Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage. Sage Series in 
written Communication 7.
FeyeraBend, p.k. 
1963. how to be a good empiricist: A plea for tolerance in matters epistemological. 
In: B. Baumrin (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Delaware seminar 2 (New york: 
Interscience), pp. 3-39.
1981. Philosophical Papers. (2 vol.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
FeynMan, r.p. 
1990. Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze. München: Piper.
Lampe Theology and rhetoric
110
GiGerenzer, G. 
2008. bauchentscheidungen: Die Intelligenz des Unbewussten und die Macht 
der Intuition. Munich: goldman.
hahn, F. 
2002. Theologie des Neuen Testaments. (2 vol.) Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
hesse, M. 
1970. Is there an independent observation language? In: R. Colodny (ed.), The 
Nature and Function of Scientific Theories (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg 
Press), pp. 36-77.
hüBner, h. 
1992. die Rhetorik und die Theologie. In: C.J. Classen & h.-J. Müllenbrock (eds.), 
Die Macht des Wortes: Aspekte gegenwärtiger Rhetorikforschung (Marburg: 
hitzeroth, Ars Rhetorica 4), pp. 165-179.
1993. biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments. band 2: Die Theologie 
des Paulus und ihre neutestamentliche Wirkungsgeschichte. göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
huMe, d. 
1972. An enquiry concerning human understanding. (Ed. L.A. Shelby-Bigge; 2nd 
ed.) oxford: Clarendon.
laMpe, p. 
1990. Theological wisdom and the “word about the cross”: The rhetorical 
scheme in I Corinthians 1-4. Interpretation 44:117-131.
1995. Identification with Christ: A psychological view of Pauline theology. In: 
T. Fornberg & d. hellholm (eds.), Text and Contexts: Festschrift Lars Hartman 
(oslo: Scandanavian University Press), pp. 931-943.
2012. New Testament theology in a secular world: A constructivist work in 
philosophical epistemology and Christian apologetics. (Translated by Robert L. 
Brawley from the german edition, with substantial subsequent revisions and 
augmentations by the author). London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark.
lincoln, a.t. & wedderBurn, a.J.M. 
1993. The theology of the later Pauline letters. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
lohse, e. 
1996. Paulus: Eine biographie. Munich: Beck.
luther, M. 
1914. D. Martin Luthers Werke: Weimaraner Ausgabe Tischreden. Vol 3. 
(weimar: h. Böhlaus Nachfolger).
Mckenzie, c.r.M. & nelson, J.d. 
2003. what a speaker’s choice of frame reveals: Reference points, frame 
selection, and framing effects. Psychonomic bulletin and Review 10:596-602.
Acta Theologica 2013: 2
111
Meyer, p.w. 
1997. Pauline Theology. In: E.E. Johnson & d.M. hay (eds.), Pauline Theology, 
IV: Looking back, Pressing on (Atlanta, ga.: Scholars Press, SBL Symposium 
Series 4), pp. 140-160.
neurath, o. 
1932/33. Protokollsätze. Erkenntnis 3:204-214.
olson, G.a. 
2002. Justifying belief: Stanley Fish and the work of rhetoric. Albany: State 
University of New york Press.
roth, G. 
2001. Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit: Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre 
philosophischen Konsequenzen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
russel, B. 
1956 [1924]. Logical atomism. In: R. Marsh (ed.), Logic and knowledge: Essays 
1901-1950 (London: Allen & Unwin), pp. 321-343.
schüssler Fiorenza, e. 
1999. Rhetoric and ethic: The politics of biblical studies. Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress.
scott, r.i. 
1967. on viewing rhetoric as epistemic. Central States Speech Journal 18:9-17.
sher, s. & Mckenzie, c.r.M. 
2006. Information leakage from logically equivalent frames. Cognition 
101:467-494.
stenGer, h. & GeisslinGer, h. 
1991. die Transformation sozialer Realität: Ein Beitrag zur empirischen 
wissenssoziologie. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 
43:247-270.
stuhlMacher, p. 
1967. Erwägungen zum ontologischen Charakter der kaine ktisis bei Paulus. 
EvTh 27:1-35.
thurén, l. 
2000. Derhetorizing Paul. A dynamic perspective on Pauline theology and the 
law. Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck. wUNT 124.
von GlasersFeld, e. 
1985. Einführung in den Konstruktivismus. Munich: oldenbourgh. Schriften der 
Carl Friedrich v. Siemens Stiftung 10.
von Goethe, J.w. 
1984. berliner Ausgabe: Kunsttheoretische Schriften und Übersetzungen [band 
17–22]. (Vol 18; ed. S. Seidel). Berlin: Aufbau.
Lampe Theology and rhetoric
112
vos, J. 
2010. Rhetoric and theology in the Letters of Paul. In: P. Sampley & P. Lampe 
(eds.), Paul and rhetoric (New york/London: T&T Clark), pp. 161-179.
weiss, J. 
1897. beiträge zur Paulinischen Rhetorik: Sonderdruck aus Theologische 
Studien – Festschrift bernhard Weiss. göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. 
Keywords   Trefwoorde
Rhetoric   Retoriek
Theology   Teologie
Constructivism   Konstruktiwisme
New Creation   Nuwe skepping
Philosophy of Language  Filosofie van taal
